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CHAPTER 11 AS A MASS TORT SOLUTION
Barbara J. Houser*
I. INTRODUCTION
Most bankruptcies involving mass tort claims are rooted in a de-
fective product which was manufactured and distributed to a large
number of people. The injury allegedly caused by the defective
product might not manifest itself until years after the initial exposure
to the product. Manifestation of the injury, and therefore the iden-
tity of particular claimants, may not be known until many years fol-
lowing the initial exposure to a product and/or a potential chapter 11
filing. Companies which become debtors in "mass tort" bankruptcy
cases are usually faced with defending a staggering number of law-
suits based on injuries allegedly caused by the use of their product.
The cost of managing the litigation crisis and of defending against
thousands of claims ultimately precipitates the chapter 11 filing.
Chapter 11 has been, and will continue to be, an important tool
to assist companies in bringing closure to what appears to be an in-
surmountable problem: how can thousands, if not hundreds of thou-
sands, of claims asserted in disparate courts around the country and
potentially in foreign jurisdictions, be resolved in a cost efficient and
fair manner? Under certain circumstances, chapter 11 may provide
the only effective way of dealing with mass tort claims.
The immediate result of a chapter 11 filing is to automatically
"stay" or stop the continued prosecution of pending litigation-or the
filing of new litigation-against the chapter 11 debtor. In addition,
assuming due process considerations can be adequately addressed, a
chapter 11 filing ultimately provides the debtor with a "discharge" of
such current and future mass tort claims through confirmation of a
chapter 11 plan of reorganization that effectively deals with those
claims. Because most senior management teams prefer not to seek
* Ms. Houser is a shareholder in the Dallas office of Sheinfeld, Maley &
Kay, PC and specializes in complex corporate reorganization matters. She is a
member of the National Bankruptcy Conference. Ms. Houser currently repre-
sents Dow Coming Corporation in its Chapter 11 case.
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protection under chapter 11 and subject themselves to the burdens of
operating a large, diversified business as a chapter 11 debtor-in-
possession, chapter 11 is frequently considered too late in the process
to be most effective. While it is appropriate for chapter 11 to be a
remedy of "last resort," implementation of a chapter 11 alternative
should not be delayed for such an extended period of time that its ef-
fectiveness is adversely impacted.
This Essay will briefly discuss how and why chapter 11 can be an
effective way to address and resolve mass tort claims. Specifically,
the Essay discusses such chapter 11 functions as the automatic stay,
transfering claims, future claims, and claim estimation. In the spirit
of full disclosure, this Essay will also briefly discuss problems that
must be successfully overcome to make chapter 11 an effective mass
tort solution.
IL AUTOMATIC STAY-11 U.S.C. § 362
A. As to the Debtor
The most significant and immediate benefit realized by a com-
pany filing for relief under the Bankruptcy Code is the automatic stay
of all litigation pending or threatened against the filing company.
Specifically, section 362(a) provides that the filing of a bankruptcy
petition operates as a stay of:
(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issu-
ance or employment of process, of a judicial, administrative,
or other action or proceeding against the debtor that was or
could have been commenced before the commencement of
the case under this title, or to recover a claim against the
debtor that arose before the commencement of the case un-
der this title.'
For a company whose very existence is threatened by the over-
whelming burden of defending against ongoing litigation arising from
its allegedly defective product, the automatic stay of all litigation is
an enormous benefit. Unless the bankruptcy court grants relief from
this automatic stay, the stay remains in effect during the pendency of
the chapter 11 case.2 The automatic stay terminates upon confirma-
tion of a plan of reorganization. However, confirmation of such a
plan of reorganization results in a "discharge" of all claims against
1. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) (1994).
2. See id. § 362(c).
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the debtor except as provided in the plan.3
The Bankruptcy Code specifies certain procedures that parties
can utilize to obtain relief from the automatic stay.4 A claimant must
show cause for relief which outweighs the policy considerations un-
derlying chapter 11 bankruptcy filings.5 Relief from the automatic
stay has not been granted regularly in mass tort cases because allow-
ing the continued prosecution of such claims precludes debtors from
receiving the benefits that Congress intended debtors to receive when
filing for relief under the Bankruptcy Code. Such benefits include
the automatic stay and a "breathing spell" from continuing litigation.6
B. As to Third Parties
A question frequently arises during mass tort bankruptcy cases
whether the automatic stay can be extended to non-debtor third par-
ties. The results of debtors' efforts to extend the automatic stay to
third parties have been mixed . When necessary to protect a chap-
ter 11 debtor or the reorganization process, courts have not hesitated
to enjoin litigation that continues against non-debtors, whether by
finding that it violates section 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code or by
enjoining it pursuant to their power under section 105 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code.8 The case for injunctive relief is even more compelling
in situations involving mass torts and thousands of litigation cases.
3. See id. § 1141(d); discussion infra Part VII.
4. See 11 U.S.C. §362(d).
5. See id § 362(d)(1).
6. See S. REP. No. 95-989, at 92 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787,
5787.
7. See generally A.H. Robins Co. v. Piccinin (In re A.H. Robins Co.), 788
F.2d 994, 999 (4th Cir. 1986) (holding that relief may be available to non-
bankrupt defendants only in unusual circumstances).
8. See, e.g., American Film Tech., Inc. v. Taritero (In re American Film
Tech., Inc.), 175 B.R. 847, 855 (Bankr. D. Del. 1994) (holding that an injunction
will be granted for suits against present and former directors); Eastern Airlines,
Inc. v. Rolleston (In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc.), 111 B.R. 423, 433-36 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1990), aff'd in part, 124 B.R. 35 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991) (allowing in-
junctions against the collection of debts which could have been brought against
partnerships); Lahman Mfg. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank of Aberdeen (In re Lahman
Mfg. Co.), 33 B.R. 681, 683 (Bankr. D. S.D. 1983) (granting debtor a preliminary
injunction against bank's further proceeding against principal shareholders and
officers); Old Orchard Invest. Co. v. A.D.I. Distrib., Inc. (In re Old Orchard In-
vest., Inc.), 31 B.R. 599, 603 (W.D. Mich. 1983) (general partners may enjoin ac-
tions to collect debts which could have been brought against partnership); Otero
Mills, Inc. v. Security Bank and Trust (In re Otero Mills, Inc.), 21 B.R. 777, 779-
80 (Bankr. D. N.M. 1982), aff'd, 25 B.R. 1018 (D. N.M. 1982) (debtor granted
injunction to prevent creditor from bringing action against debtor's president).
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In A.H. Robins Co. v. Piccinin (In re A.H. Robins),9 the Fourth
Circuit approved the use of section 105 to extend the automatic stay
under section 362 to protect non-debtor parties.'0 In Robins, the
debtor was a defendant in more than five thousand lawsuits growing
out of its sale of the Dalkon Shield intrauterine device when it filed
its chapter 11 case." In many of those suits, other parties were named
as additional defendants, including Robins's product liability insurer,
various physicians, and members of the Robins family who were di-
rectors and shareholders. 2 At the debtor's request shortly after the
chapter 11 filing, the district court enjoined continued prosecution of
the litigation against Robins's co-defendants. 3 The court found that
the suits against the co-defendants would interfere with Robins's
ability to reorganize and, if the plaintiffs were successful, the suits
could either collaterally estop Robins from denying liability in subse-
quent lawsuits or subject the co-defendants to inconsistent judg-
ments. 4 The district court further found that any hardship to the
plaintiffs was outweighed by the irreparable harm to the debtor and
its creditors as well as the public interest in promoting the viability of
Robins's reorganization."
The Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that injunctive relief for the
non-debtors could be grounded on either section 362 or section 105
of the Bankruptcy Code. 6 Even though section 362(a)(1) generally
applies only to a debtor, the Fourth Circuit determined that it may be
appropriate to extend the section 362(a)(1) stay to protect non-
debtor parties when "unusual circumstances" are present, such as
"when there is such identity between the debtor and the third-party
defendant that the debtor may be said to be the real party defendant
and that a judgment against the third-party defendant will in effect be
a judgment or finding against the debtor."' 7 The court also examined
whether section 362(a)(3), which forbids actions "to obtain posses-
sion of property of the estate.., or to exercise control over property
of the estate,' 8 would stay actions against non-debtors and concluded
9. 788 F.2d 994 (4th Cir. 1986).
10. See id. at 1003.
11. See id. at 996.
12. See id.
13. See id. at 1008.
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See id at 1003.
17. Id. at 999.
18. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (a)(3) (1994).
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that section 362(a)(3) could provide an independent basis for enjoin-
ing actions against non-debtors.19 Finally, the court concluded that
the bankruptcy court may exercise its injunctive power under section
105 when the failure to enjoin would affect the bankruptcy estate or
adversely influence and pressure the debtor to the action of the non-
debtor.' Injunctive relief under section 105 would be appropriate to
stay a variety of proceedings that would undermine the debtor's abil-
ity to formulate a chapter 11 plan, including discovery against the
debtor or its employees.21 Indeed, other courts have come to the
same conclusions. '
Bankruptcy courts clearly have the authority to enjoin litigation
against non-debtors pursuant to sections 105 or 362 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code. This ability to stop litigation against the debtor and,
under appropriate circumstances, third parties is a powerful tool to
gain control over mass tort litigation.
III. TRANSFER OF CLAIMS-28 U.S.C. § 157(B) (5)
A. As to the Debtor
Section 1334(b) of Title 28 sets forth Congress' jurisdictional
grant to the district courts for bankruptcy cases and related proceed-
ings:
Notwithstanding any Act of Congress that confers exclusive
jurisdiction on a court or courts other than the district
courts, the district courts shall have original but not exclu-
sive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under title 11,
19. See In re A.H. Robins, 788 F.2d at 1001-02.
20. See id. at 1003.
21. See id. (quoting Johns-Manville Corp. v. Asbestos Litig. Group (In re
Johns-Manville), 40 B.R. 219, 226 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)); see also In re A.H. Robins
Co., 828 F.2d 1023, 1025 (4th Cir. 1987) (reaffirming use of section 105 to enjoin
actions against non-debtor).
22. See, e.g, Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300, 305, 310 (1995) (holding
a collateral attack on a § 105 injunction impermissible, the Court quotes the
bankruptcy court opinion granting injunction with approval); American Imaging
Servs., Inc. v. Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. (In re Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc.), 963 F.2d
855, 860-62 (6th Cir. 1992) (relying on principles developed in Robins and Johns-
Manville, the court upholds injunctions for non-debtor parties); Johns-Manville
Corp. v. Asbestos Litig. Group (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 26 B.R. 420, 424
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983) (granting injunctive relief to protect various officers, di-
rectors, employees, insurers and other agents of Manville and to halt discovery
and actions involving the same issues and subject matter as the issues facing
Manville directly), affd, 40 B.R. 219 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
January 1998]
456 LOYOLA OFLOSANGELES LAWREVIEW [Vol.31:451
or arising in or related to cases under title 11.
Although the term "related to" is not defined in the statute, the Su-
preme Court recently confirmed in Celotex Corp. v. Edwards? that
"[Congress's] choice of words suggests a grant of some breadth." In
Celotex, the Supreme Court adopted the expansive definition of
"related to" jurisdiction uniformly embraced by the circuit courts in
numerous prior decisions:
[t]he usual articulation of the test for determining whether a
civil proceeding is related to bankruptcy is whether the out-
come of that proceeding could conceivably have any effect on
the estate being administered in bankruptcy .... Thus, the
proceeding need not necessarily be against the debtor or
against the debtor's property. An action is related to bank-
ruptcy if the outcome could alter the debtor's rights, liabili-
ties, options, or freedom of action (either positively or
negatively) and which in any way impacts upon the handling
and administration of the bankrupt estate.'
Mass tort litigation cases pending against the debtor are obvi-
ously "related to" the bankruptcy case within the meaning of 28
U.S.C. § 1334(b). Thus, such cases are within the jurisdiction of the
district courts and, by order of reference, the bankruptcy courts. In
the context of mass tort litigation, the various claims pending against
the debtor are typically scattered in state and federal courts through-
out the United States. Another significant benefit of a chapter 11
filing is that the debtor may seek to centralize all such litigation in the
district court where the bankruptcy case is pending. Section
157(b)(5) of Title 28 provides:
The district court shall order that personal injury tort and
wrongful death claims shall be tried in the district court in
which the bankruptcy case is pending, or in the district court
in the district in which the claim arose, as determined by the
district court in which the bankruptcy case is pending.'
As noted in Robins, the purpose of this provision is "to centralize the
23. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b).
24. 514 U.S. 300 (1995).
25. Id. at 307-08.
26. Id. at 308 n.6 (quoting Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984, 994 (3d Cir.
1984)); see In re G.S.F., Corp., 938 F.2d 1467, 1475 (1st Cir. 1991); In re Wood,
825 F.2d 90, 93 (5th Cir. 1987); A.H. Robins Co. v. Piccinin (In re A.H. Robins),
788 F.2d 994, 1002 n.11 (4th Cir. 1986).
27. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5).
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administration of the estate and to eliminate the 'multiplicity of fo-
rums [sic] for the adjudication of parts of a bankruptcy case."' The
case law interpreting section 157(b)(5) has looked to the following
factors to determine if the transfer of personal injury tort cases to a
single forum will promote the reorganization goals of the debtor and
provide a fair and non-preferential forum for the resolution of those
pending tort claims:
" Large number of separate tort cases are pending against
the debtor or are expected to be brought against the
debtor;
* Multiplicity of jurisdictions (state, federal and/or inter-
national) where tort cases are pending;
" Significant monetary expense would be incurred by the
debtor in defense of tort claims in disparate courts;
* Substantial time and energies of the debtor and its offi-
cers and executives are required for defense of tort liti-
gation;
* Unsettled issues regarding liability or damages exist that
will necessitate adjudication or estimation prior to con-
firmation of the debtor's plan;
* Inconsistent pre-bankruptcy judgments have been ren-
dered against the debtor regarding tort liabilities;
* Consolidation of litigation will promote the timely de-
velopment of the debtor's plan of reorganization; and
* Consolidation of litigation will permit the development
of consensual dispute resolution procedures at lower
cost than full adjudication.29
In most mass tort bankruptcy cases, these factors are present.
Thus, 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) provides the debtor with a powerful tool
to consolidate and transfer all pending litigation against it to a cen-
tralized forum. Even more significantly, section 157(b)(5) clearly
provides that cases transferred pursuant to its terms will ultimately
be liquidated in federal district court-either where the bankruptcy
case is pending or where the claim arose, as determined by the dis-
trict court where the bankruptcy case is pending-if they cannot be
28. In re A.H. Robins, 788 F.2d at 1011.
29. See id.; Coker v. Pan American World Airways, Inc. (In re Pan Am
Corp.), 950 F.2d 839 (2d Cir. 1994); Murray v. Pan American World Airways,
Inc. (In re Pan Am Corp.), 16 F.3d 513 (2d Cir. 1984).
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settled in a consensual plan confirmed by the bankruptcy court? In
addition, transferred cases will not be returned for adjudication in
their state court of origin absent abstention by the district court pre-
siding over the bankruptcy case.3'
B. As to Third Parties
The extent to which the debtor, or third parties, can seek to
transfer claims against such non-debtor third parties to the district
court presiding over the bankruptcy case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
157(b)(5) turns in the first instance on the scope of "related to" ju-
risdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) as discussed above. When faced
with such a request, the courts are required to analyze what effect the
continuing litigation of claims against the non-debtor co-defendants
could conceivably have on the debtor's bankruptcy estate.32 The most
common grounds for such non-debtor co-defendants to argue that
"related to" jurisdiction exists include: (i) the assertion of contingent
and unliquidated claims for contribution and indemnification; (ii) the
existence of jointly owned insurance policies; (iii) the possibility of
collateral estoppel being successfully asserted against the debtor with
a corresponding increased exposure of the debtor to liability; and (iv)
the burden that may be imposed upon the debtor if the debtor is
forced to "voluntarily" participate in the ongoing litigation against
the co-defendant due to the interrelationship between the debtor and
such co-defendant.3
In In re Dow Coming Corporation," the debtor sought to trans-
fer claims pending against it and its two shareholders, The Dow
Chemical Company and Coming Incorporated, to the Eastern Dis-
trict of Michigan. 5 The district court granted transfer under 28
30. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5).
31. See, e.g., In re Dow Coming Corp., 86 F.3d 482, 497-98 (6th Cir. 1996)
(holding that transfer a motion requires an abstention analysis; remanded to dis-
trict court for same), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 718 (1997), on remand, 1996 WL
511646 (E.D. Mich. 1996) (district court abstaining on a wholesale basis), rev'd,
113 F.3d 565 (6th Cir. 1997) (granting the mandamus petition; finding that dis-
cretionary abstention was improper and that the district court was required to
analyze mandatory abstention issues on a case by case basis), petition for cert.
filed, 66 U.S.L.W. 3129 (Aug. 4, 1997).
32. See In re Dow Coming, 86 F.3d at 490.
33. See id.
34. 187 B.R. 919 (E.D. Mich. 1995), rev'd, 86 F.3d 482 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
117 S. Ct. 718 (1997).
35. See id. at 921.
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U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) as to all claims pending against Dow Coming. 6
However, the district court declined to transfer claims against Dow
Coming's shareholders, concluding that it lacked "related to" juris-
diction over such claims.' On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed and
found that "related to" jurisdiction did in fact exist." The court was
persuaded that the existence of claims for contribution and indemnity
by Dow Chemical and Coming against Dow Coming:
suffices to establish a conceivable impact on the estate in
bankruptcy. Claims for indemnification and contribution,
whether asserted against or by Dow Coming, obviously
would affect the size of the estate and the length of time the
bankruptcy proceedings will be pending, as well as Dow
Corning's ability to resolve its liabilities and proceed with
reorganization."
Moreover, because Dow Coming, Dow Chemical, and Corning were
joint insureds under a number of insurance policies, the Sixth Circuit
concluded that the continuation of disparate litigation against Dow
Chemical and Corning could have an adverse impact upon the single
largest asset in Dow Corning's estate, its jointly owned insurance.,o
This potential adverse impact supported a finding of "related to" ju-
risdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b). In addressing the issue of the
appropriateness of transferring thousands of claims under 28 U.S.C. §
157(b)(5), the Sixth Circuit noted:
[O]ur primary goal is to establish a mechanism for resolving
the claims at issue in the most fair and equitable manner
possible. In seeking to achieve that goal, we are called upon
to balance four different, and frequently competing, inter-
ests: those of the individuals who have brought and will
bring breast implant claims; Dow Corning's interests with
regard to its attempt to formulate a successful reorganiza-
tion plan; Dow Chemical and Coming Incorporated's inter-
ests as shareholders of Dow Corning; and the judicial sys-
tem's interest in allocating its limited resources effectively
and efficiently.42
36. See id. at 932.
37. See id.
38. See In re Dow Corning, 86 F.3d at 494.
39. Id.
40. See id. at 494-95.
41. See id. at 495.
42. Id. at 487.
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In addition to Dow Corning's efforts to transfer breast implant
claims pending against it and its shareholders, three unrelated co-
defendants sought the transfer of breast implant- claims pending
against them to the Eastern District of Michigan in accordance with
section 157(b)(5).' The district court concluded that it lacked
"related to" jurisdiction to order the transfer of claims pending
against these co-defendants." While the Sixth Circuit initially re-
versed, finding that the existence of contribution and/or indemnity
claims from these co-defendants did provide a basis for "related to"
jurisdiction,45 they ultimately agreed with the district court's decision
to abstain from the claims asserted against the unrelated co-
defendants.'
The ability of a debtor and third parties to successfully use 28
U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) to transfer claims pending against them to the dis-
trict court with jurisdiction over the bankruptcy case can be an ex-
tremely effective tool to gain control over mass tort litigation and
thereafter propose a centralized resolution of all such claims.
IV. FUTURE CLAIMS
A major issue in virtually all mass tort cases is how to deal with
"future" claims. These claims are generally held and asserted by per-
sons who have used or been exposed to the debtor's product-for ex-
ample, breast implants or asbestos-before the bankruptcy filing but
who do not manifest injuries from those products until after confir-
mation of a plan of reorganization in the bankruptcy case. Such
claims may also be asserted by persons who have neither had contact
with, nor manifested injury from, the debtors' pre-petition product,
for example, an allegedly defective aircraft until after plan confirmation.48
43. See id. at 486-87.
44. See id. at 487.
45. See id. at 490-94.
46. See Lindsey v. Dow Chemical Co. (In re Dow Coming Corp.), 113 F.3d
565, 568 (6th Cir. 1997).
47. See Johns-Manville Corp. v. Asbestos Litig. Group (In re Johns-Manville
Corp.), 26 B.R. 420,422 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983) (noting that 32,000 lawsuits were
projected to be brought against manufacturer and supplier of asbestos products
for twenty-seven years after the filing of the original suit); In re Amatex Corp.,
755 F.2d 1034, 1041 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding that individuals exposed to asbestos
who have not shown signs of injury do have stake in outcome of proceedings);
see also In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., 1994 WL 578353 at
*26 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 1, 1994) (releasing settling defendants and released parties
from any "future" claims by class members).
48. See In re Piper Aircraft Corp., 162 B.R. 619, 629 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1994),
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Dealing with these claims in the bankruptcy case, while striving
to satisfy the dual bankruptcy goals of providing a fresh start for the
debtor and ensuring equal treatment of all creditors, raises difficult
issues for which the Bankruptcy Code provides little or no specific
statutory guidance. How should "future claims" be defined? How
can unknown future claimants be afforded sufficient legal represen-
tation and due process? Should a court estimate future claims for
purposes of plan feasibility and distribution? Can future claims
against the debtor be discharged upon plan confirmation? Can the
bankruptcy court issue an injunction, in connection with plan confir-
mation, that channels future claims to a plan-created trust or other
facility for liquidation and payment, and prohibits the assertion of
those claims against the reorganized debtor and perhaps other par-
ties? Each of these questions raises complex issues, the answers to
which will affect the success of the chapter 11 solution to the mass
tort problem.49
Achieving a workable definition of "future claim" has produced
much litigation and dissension among the courts. A "future claim-
ant" is generally referred to as an individual who, as of the petition
date, has no manifest injury resulting from a debtor's tortious pre-
petition conduct. 4 A classic example is a person who is exposed to
asbestos that was manufactured by the debtor pre-petition who as of
plan confirmation has not manifested an asbestos-related disease. "If
such a 'future claimant' holds a 'claim' under section 101(5) [of the
Bankruptcy Code], that claim will be discharged under section
1141(d)(1)."'" If not, the impact of those claims upon the reorganized
debtor or its successor after plan confirmation can be devastating.
affd, 58 F.3d 1573 (11th Cir. 1995).
49. The National Bankruptcy Review Commission has recommended certain
amendments to the Bankruptcy Code to provide more certainty in how courts
can deal with these issues in a mass tort bankruptcy case. See Barbara J. Houser
et al., Mass Torts and Other Future Claims, SB37 ALI-ABA 89, 105-07 (1997).
Whether Congress acts upon the recommendation of the Bankruptcy Commis-
sion and amends the relevant statutes remains to be seen. While the author be-
lieves that the recommendations of the Bankruptcy Commission on "future
claims" should be adopted by Congress, this article will not discuss such recom-
mendations.
50. See Margaret I. Lyle, Note, Mass Tort Claims and the Corporate Tortfea-
sor: Bankruptcy Reorganization and Legislative Compensation Versus the Com-
mon-Law Tort System, 61 TEx. L. REv. 1297, 1329 (1983); see also In re UNR
Indus., 29 B.R. 741, 745 (D.C. 1983) (distinguishing individuals who may even-
tually claim money from the debtors for injuries resulting from asbestos expo-
sure).
51. Hoser et al., supra note 49, at 98.
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Thus, deciding on an appropriate definition of "future claim" is sig-
nificant, especially in mass tort or other product liability cases where
the importance of such claims can be magnified by the nature of the
debtor's product and the relative latency of diseases or injuries asso-
ciated with the product.5 2
In determining whether future claimants hold a "claim" under
section 101(5), the courts must balance the policy of the debtor's
"fresh start" against the fundamental fairness and due process rights
of future claimants.53 The broadest possible definition of "claim"
provides the most protection to the debtor and ensures that its effec-
tive reorganization will not be compromised by post-confirmation
lawsuits arising out of the debtor's pre-petition conduct. At the same
time, this extremely expansive definition of "claim" could deprive re-
dress to a person who has no knowledge whatsoever of his or her in-
juries-or even the potential for injury. Unknown to the debtor, this
individual may have no meaningful opportunity to participate in the
debtor's bankruptcy case.
The scope of the definition of "future claim" can also impact dis-
tributions to other creditors under the debtor's plan as well as the
debtor's post-confirmation value and financial health., If the
debtor's plan of reorganization provides for distributions to indi-
viduals with future claims for inchoate injuries, the dividend paid to
creditors with manifest injuries will be diluted. Conversely, if no
provision is made for such future claimants, they will not receive any
recovery under the debtor's plan. Although their claims may not be
discharged, their ability to recover against the reorganized debtor will
depend on the debtor's post-confirmation financial health. This
could result in unequal treatment among creditors because future
claimants eventually could receive much less, or significantly more,
52. See In re Johns-Manville Corp., 36 B.R. 743, 753-57 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1984).
53. Attorneys for present claimants try to encourage a quick settlement for
their clients in order to recover for their injuries. But this could work to the det-
riment of unknown future claimants who may not obtain adequate representa-
tion for their unmanifested injuries. See Jeffrey Davis, Cramming Down Future
Claims in Bankruptcy: Fairness, Bankruptcy Policy, Due Process, and the Les-
sons of the Piper Reorganization, 70 AM. BANKR. L.J. 329, 361-82 (1996)
(discussing the justification of balancing fairness, policy, and due process); Anne
Hardiman, Toxic Torts and Chapter 11 Reorganization: The Problem of Future
Claims, 38 VAND. L. REv. 1369, 1392-95 (1985); Frank J. Macchiarola, The
Manville Personal Injury Settlement Trust: Lessons for the Future, 17 CARDOZO
L. REV. 583, 623 (1996).
54. See In re Amatex Corp., 755 F.2d 1034, 1041-43 (3d Cir. 1985).
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than other claimants provided for, and bound by, the debtor's con-
firmed plan. Further, the exclusion of future claimants from the
bankruptcy process can significantly affect the reorganized debtor's
value and impair its post-confirmation operations, for example by
undermining its ability to obtain financing.
All courts seem to agree that each person whose injuries mani-
fest themselves before a bankruptcy case commences holds a
"claim."'5  The courts also agree that persons injured by post-
confirmation activities of a reorganized debtor do not hold a
"claim." 6 The problem arises when a debtor's pre-petition conduct
results in an injury that accrues or manifests itself post-petition.5 In
grappling with these issues, the courts have developed three broad
tests to determine whether a "future claimant" has a pre-petition
"claim" within the meaning of section 101(5) of the Bankruptcy
Code: (i) the "accrued state law claim test"; (ii) the "conduct test";
and (iii) the "pre-petition relationship test." 8
Under the "accrued state law claim test," no claim accrues for
bankruptcy purposes until a claim has accrued under state law. 9
Generally, under state law, a cause of action does not accrue until an
injury manifests itself.0 Thus, under the accrued state law claim test,
future claimants do not hold a "claim" until an injury manifests itself,
even if the injury resulted from the debtor's pre-petition conduct and
the claimant's exposure to the debtor's injury causing conduct oc-
curred pre-petition. Many criticize the "accrued state law claim test"
because (i) it seems inconsistent with congressional intent that the
definition of.a "claim" be extremely broad,6 (ii) its narrow definition
of "claim" conflicts with the bankruptcy policy of providing the
debtor with a "fresh start", 2 and (iii) it hinders the reorganization
55. See id.
56. See In re A.H. Robins Co., 88 B.R. 742,754 (E.D. Va. 1988).
57. See Avellino & Bienes v. M. Frenville Co. (In re M. Frenville Co.), 744
F.2d 332,334 (3d Cir. 1984).
58. See In re Piper, 162 B.R. at 624-27.
59. See In re M. Frenville, 744 F.2d at 337-38.
60. See, e.g., United States v. LTV Corp. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 944 F.2d
997, 1004 (2d Cir. 1991); Schweitzer v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 758 F.2d 936, 941
(3d Cir. 1985); In re Amatex Corp., 30 B.R. 309, 311 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1983),
affd, 37 B.R. 613 (E.D. Pa. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 755 F.2d 1034 (3d Cir.
1985); see also Davies v. Krasna, 14 Cal. 3d 502,512, 12 Cal. Rptr. 705,712 (1975)
(holding that "[L]imitations clock only begins to run on certain causes of action
when the injured party discovers or should have discovered the facts supporting
liability.").
61. See In re Piper, 162 B.R. at 624.
62. See id.
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process.63 Most bankruptcy courts addressing the issue have rejected
the "accrued state law claim test."'
Under the "conduct test," a right to payment, and thus a bank-
ruptcy "cliim," arises when the debtor's conduct giving rise to the
alleged liability occurred. 6 As a general rule, the "conduct test"
seems consistent with congressional intent to define "claim" broadly
and treat all creditors equally. 66 Under this test, all claims arising out
of the same conduct are treated equally, and the debtor can obtain a
discharge of all such claims, thus facilitating an effective reorganiza-
tion. The problem with the "conduct test" is that it may be too
broad. Claimants who have had no pre-petition exposure to the
debtor's products or no other pre-petition relationship or contact
with the debtor would be subject to discharge before their injury oc-
curs. Because these people, as of plan confirmation, are unidentifi-
able given their lack of contact with the debtor or its products, they
cannot receive notice and participate in the bankruptcy, which raises
substantial, if not insurmountable, concerns about fundamental fair-
ness and due process. Under this test, a debtor could obtain confir-
mation of a plan that discharges future claimants even if the debtor
could not identify and provide notice to those persons-individually
or by category-who may eventually be injured by the debtor's pre-
petition conduct.67
63. Many courts outside the Third Circuit that have considered this test have
rejected it. See, e.g., Fairchild Aircraft Inc. v. Cambell (In re Fairchild Aircraft
Corp.), 184 B.R. 910 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1995); In re Amfesco Indust., Inc., 81
B.R. 777 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1988); Acevedo v. Van Dorn Plastics Mach. Co., 68
B.R. 495 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1986); In re Johns-Manville Corp., 57 B.R. 680
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986).
64. See Grady v. A.H. Robins Co. (In re A.H. Robins Co.), 839 F.2d 198, 201
(4th Cir. 1988); In re Food Barn Stores, Inc., 175 B.R. 723, 730-31 (Bankr. W.D.
Mo. 1994); In re Black, 70 B.R. 645, 648-50 (Bankr. D. Utah 1986); In re Johns-
Manville Corp., 57 B.R. 680, 689 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986); In re Yanks, 49 B.R.
56, 58-59 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1985); see also Ralph R. Mabey & Annette W. Jarvis,
In re Frenville: A Critique by the National Bankruptcy Conference's Committee
on Claims and Distributions, 42 Bus. LAW. 697 (1986) (criticizing the Frenville
court's adoption of the "accrued state law claim test").
65. See Grady, 839 F.2d at 199; Waterman Steamship Corp. v. Aguiar (In re
Waterman Steamship Corp.), 141 B.R. 552, 556 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) (holding
that "a claim arises at the moment when acts giving rise to the alleged liability are
performed").
66. See Grady, 839 F.2d at 200 ("Congress intended that the definition of
claim in the Code be as broad as possible .... ."); H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 10
(1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963,6266.
67. See United States v. LTV Corp. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 944 F.2d 997,
1003 (2d Cir. 1991); Kewanee Boiler Corp. v. Smith (In re Kewanee Boiler
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In an attempt to cure the shortcomings of the conduct test, some
courts have adopted the "pre-petition relationship test.""' Under this
test, the debtor's tortious conduct must still occur pre-petition, but
the future claimant must also have some pre-petition relationship
with the debtor, such as a pre-petition purchase, use, or operation of,
or exposure to, the debtor's product." The "pre-petition relationship
test" often allows the court to identify and notify future claimants
when the allegedly defective nature of a product is known at the time
of the bankruptcy and there is some reasonable basis upon which to
provide actual notice of the bankruptcy case to known potential
claimants and/or fashion publication notice to a reasonably well-
defined group of potential future claimants 0 In this sense, the "pre-
petition relationship test" ameliorates the problem often attributed
to the "conduct test"-that a bankruptcy proceeding cannot identify
and afford due process to claimants.
V. REPRESENTATION OF CURRENT AND FUTURE CLAIMANTS
A. Committees Appointed by the United States Trustee
The Bankruptcy Act, the predecessor to the current Bankruptcy
Code, established that the purpose of granting official status and
standing to creditors' committees was to bring creditors into the
bankruptcy adjudication process.7' Creditors should have an active
role in the reorganization process in recognition of their significant
economic interest in the debtor's estate.7 In most chapter 11 cases,
the Office of the United States trustee appoints a committee of unse-
cured creditors.73 Section 1102(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code
authorizes such action by the United States trustee and provides that
"as soon as practicable after the order for relief under chapter 11 ...
the United States trustee shall appoint a committee of creditors
holding unsecured claims and may appoint additional committees of
creditors or of equity security holders as the United States trustee
Corp.), 198 B.R. 519, 528 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996), remanded on other grounds,
1996 WL 556736 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 26, 1996).
68. See In re Piper, 162 B.R. at 625-27.
69. See id. at 627, In re Chateaugay, 944 F.2d at 1003.
70. See California Dept. of Health Servs. v. Jensen (In re Jensen), 995 F.2d
925, 930-31 (9th Cir. 1993); In re Chateauguy, 944 F.2d at 1005.
71. See In re Federation Workers Credit Union, Inc., 354 F. Supp. 1206, 1208-
09 (N.D. Ohio 1973).
72. See In re Diversified Capital Corp., 89 B.R. 826, 828-29 (Bankr. C.D. Cal.
1988).
73. See 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1) (1994).
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deems appropriate.7 4 The United States trustee will use this discre-
tionary authority to appoint an official committee of tort claimants in
a mass tort bankruptcy case.75
The Bankruptcy Code provides broad authority to official
committees to represent their constituencies. 6 Section 1103(c) of the
Bankruptcy Code sets forth a nonexclusive list of permissible activi-
ties an official committee may engage in during the course of a bank-
ruptcy case.? A committee's primary function "is to aid, assist, and
monitor the debtor to ensure that.., the views [of the committee's
constituency] are heard and their interests promoted and protected"
in the bankruptcy case.78 Since a committee's functions under section
1103 are "intimately tied to its [c]ommittee members' economic in-
terests, services performed on behalf of the [c]ommittee should be
those in attempted furtherance of such economic interests.
79
The legislative history of section 1103(c) also indicates that Con-
gress contemplated that committees would play a prominent role in
the reorganization process.
[C]ommittees ... will be the primary negotiating bodies for
the formulation of the plan of reorganization. They will
represent the various classes of creditors and equity security
holders from which they are selected. They will also pro-
vide supervision of the debtor in possession and of the trus-
tee, and will protect their constituents' interests. go
74. Id. (emphasis added).
75. A dispute exists over whether an official committee of tort claimants can
be comprised of attorneys for claimants or whether it must be comprised of ac-
tual claimants. Compare Van Arsdale v. Clemo (In re A.H. Robins Co.), 825
F.2d 794 (4th Cir. 1987) (approving reconstituted committee which includes two
attorney members) with In re Lykes Bros. Steamship Co., 200 B.R. 933 (M.D.
Fla. 1996) (holding that members of a committee must be actual creditors).
76. See Pan Am Corp. v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. (In re Pan Am Corp.), 175
B.R. 438,514 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
77. See 11 U.S.C. § 1103 (c).
78. In re Pan Am, 175 B.R. at 514; see also Official Unsecured Creditor
Committee v. Stem (In re SPM Mfg. Corp.), 984 F.2d 1305, 1315-16 (1st Cir.
1993) (holding that the committee acts as a fiduciary for their constituencies).
79. In re Wire Cloth Prods., Inc., 130 B.R. 798, 812 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1991).
80. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549, re-
printed in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 6357; see also In re Penn-Dixie Indus., Inc., 9
B.R. 941, 944 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981) (stating that a committee has a "wide and
important array of authority and responsibility... [and] the Bankruptcy Code
contemplates a significant and central role for committees in the scheme of a
business reorganization").
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B. Appointment of a Legal Representative for Future Claimants
Bankruptcy courts often appoint a legal representative for future
claimants, although there is no specific statute authorizing them to do
so.8' The courts that have made such appointments have usually
avoided squarely addressing the issue of whether future claimants
hold "claims" that may be discharged in a bankruptcy proceeding.n
Most courts simply recognize that future claimants are "parties-in-
interest" under section 1109(b) of the Bankruptcy Code who are en-
titled to legal representation regardless of whether they hold"claims.""'
Courts that have addressed the appointment of a future claims
representative have given some guidance as to its role and duties. In
In re UNR Industries, Inc.,m the court authorized a legal representa-
tive to advise future claimants during the case and represent such
claimants in court in connection with any plan of reorganization, any
motion to convert the case, and-with further leave of court-other
litigation matters in the case.85 Subject to these parameters, the
bankruptcy court authorized the legal representative to exercise the
powers and responsibilities of an official creditors' committee under
81. See, e.g., In re Piper Aircraft Corp., 162 B.R. 619, 621 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.
1994), affd sub nom. Epstein v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of the
Estate of Piper Aircraft Corp., 168 B.R. 434 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1994), aff'd, 58
F.3d 1573 (11th Cir. 1995) (explaining lower court's appointment of a legal repre-
sentative for future claimants).
82. See id. (stating that when appointing the future claims representative,
"the [c]ourt specifically excluded from the appointment order any finding on
whether the Future Claimants hold claims against the Debtor under § 101(5) of
the Bankruptcy Code").
83. See, e.g., In re Amatex Corp, 755 F.2d 1034, 1042-44 (3d Cir. 1985)
(holding that future claimants are parties-in-interest entitled to representation
regardless of whether they hold "claims"); In re Johns-Manville Corp., 68 B.R.
618, 626-27 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986) (rejecting argument that post-confirmation
injunction against continued prosecution of future claims outside the plan vio-
lated due process rights of future claimants and concluding that publication no-
tice through an extensive media campaign, when combined with the appointment
of a legal representative, provided adequate procedural protection to future
claimants); In re Johns-Manville Corp., 36 B.R. 743, 747-49 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1984) (concluding that future claimants are parties-in-interest under section 1109
and are entitled to a legal representative irrespective of whether they hold
"claims"); In re UNR Indus., Inc., 29 B.R. 741 (N.D. Ill. 1983), appeal dismissed,
725 F.2d 1111 (7th Cir. 1984), motion to reconsider granted, In re UNR Indus.,
Inc., 46 B.R. 671, 674-75 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1985) (noting that the unresolved issue
of whether future claimants hold "claims" did not preclude the appointment of a
legal representative for future claimants).
84. 46 B.R. 671 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1985).
85. See id. at 675-76.
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section 1103 of the Bankruptcy Code.86 Similarly, in In re Johns-
Manville Corp.,' the court appointed a legal representative with the
powers and responsibilities of an official creditors' committee as set
forth in section 1103.88
VI. ESTIMATION OF CLAIMS
Section 502(c) of the Bankruptcy Code authorizes the bank-
ruptcy court to estimate, for purposes of allowance, "any contingent
or unliquidated claim, the fixing or liquidation of which, as the case
may be, would unduly delay the administration of the case." 89 Sec-
tion 502(c) is designed to expedite the calculation of claims and to
provide greater certainty for the recovery of contingent or unliqui-
dated claims by bringing them into the bankruptcy estate, so that all
claimants will have the same opportunity to share in any distributions
from the estate." The bankruptcy court may estimate the claims of an
individual creditor or group of creditors if the court concludes that it
can come to a fair estimation of the claims so as to benefit the claim-
ants and the debtor by reducing costs and expediting the reorganiza-
tion.9
Although the bankruptcy court has authority to estimate per-
sonal injury or wrongful death claims for voting purposes and for de-
termining plan feasibility, the estimation of personal injury or wrong-
ful death claims for purposes of distribution in the bankruptcy case is
not within the bankruptcy court's core jurisdiction." Therefore, per-
sonal injury and wrongful death claims against the debtor that are not
consensually resolved must generally be liquidated in the federal dis-
trict court in which the bankruptcy case is pending or in the federal
district court in the district where the claim arose, as directed by the
86. See id. at 676.
87. 52 B.R. 940 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985).
88. See id. at 943.
89. 11 U.S.C. § 502(c)(1) (1994).
90. See In re Baldwin-United Corp., 55 B.R. 885, 897-98 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
1985).
91. Compare A.H. Robins Co. v. Piccinin (In re A.H. Robins Co.), 788 F.2d
994, 1011-13 (4th Cir. 1986) (allowing over 300,000 unliquidated tort claims relat-
ing to the debtor's Dalkon Shield product to proceed under section 502(c)), and
In re UNR Indus., Inc., 45 B.R. 322, 326 (N.D. IM. 1984) (allowing estimation of
over 17,000 asbestos claims for purposes of developing a plan), with In re Dow
Coming, 211 B.R. 545, 570-72 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1997) (concluding estimation
was inappropriate due to serious dispute over disease causation).
92. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B).
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district court with jurisdiction over the bankruptcy case.93 An excep-
tion to this general rule may apply if the claims can be disallowed
based upon a legal defense to the claims. In that instance, the bank-
ruptcy court may exercise its core jurisdiction to disallow the per-
sonal injury claim.94
The bankruptcy court has broad discretion to determine the best
method of estimation.9 Notwithstanding this discretion to establish
estimation procedures, the bankruptcy court must give effect to "the
legal rules which may govern the ultimate value of the claim."' 6 Pres-
ent law is uncertain as to the effect of estimation under section 502(c)
on claimsY At least one court has held that estimation sets a cap on
the amount of the estimated claims for distribution purposes, while
another has held that estimation merely sets an upper limit on claims
for voting purposes but does not limit distributions.98
Even courts within the same line of authority have reached dif-
fering conclusions as to how section 502(c) should be applied. For ex-
ample, in In re Baldwin-United Corporation," the district court stated
that estimation sets the outer limits for recovery so that the claimants
would be entitled to recover the amount of their judgment or the es-
timated value of their claims, whichever was lower.'0 Later, the
bankruptcy court stated that estimation sets the outer limits of a
claimant's recovery subject to a later motion under section 502(j) of
93. See id. § 157(b)(5); see, e.g., In re A.H. Robins, 788 F.2d at 1012-13; In re
UNR, 45 B.R. at 327.
94. See, e.g., In re Standard Insulations, Inc., 138 B.R. 947, 953 (Bankr. W.D.
Mo. 1992) (noting that section 157(b)(2)(B) does "not prevent the court from
disallowing [personal-injury tort] claims if they ha[ve] no basis at law") (citing In
re Chateaugay Corp., 111 B.R. 67, 74 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990)); In re Chateaugay,
111 B.R. at 73-74 (holding that bankruptcy court could exercise core jurisdiction
over summary judgment motion seeking to disallow personal-injury claims
barred by government contractor defense).
95. See Bittner v. Borne Chemical Co., 691 F.2d 134, 135 (3d Cir. 1982)
(stating that bankruptcy judges are to use "whatever method is best suited to the
particular contingencies at issue").
96. Id.; see also In re Baldwin-United, 55 B.R. at 898-900 (discussing the limits
of the court's discretion in estimating claims).
97. See generally In re Baldwin-United, 55 B.R. at 898-902 (discussing the un-
certainty of methods and effects of estimation).
98. Compare In re Poole Funeral Chapel, Inc., 63 B.R 527, 532 (Bankr. N.D.
Ala. 1986) (holding that bankruptcy court had duty to estimate non-tort claims
for purposes of confirmation and distribution), with In re MCorp Fin., Inc., 137
B.R. 219, 226 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1992) (stating that estimation requirements do
not establish a cap on distribution).
99. 57 B.R. 751 (S.D. Ohio 1985).
100. See id. at 758.
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the Bankruptcy Code to reconsider the estimated amount of the al-
lowed claim.'0' In United States v. LTV (In re Chateaugay Corpora-
tion),"° the Second Circuit stated that estimated claims would be paid
based upon their ultimately liquidated amount, in full or pro-rata,
depending upon the terms of the reorganization plan.'13 Finally, in In
re MCorp Financial, Inc.,"34 the bankruptcy court denied confirmation
of a chapter 11 plan of liquidation because that plan denied claimants
the right to a section 502(j) reconsideration of their estimated claims
and did not establish a reserve to pay the claims if they were later re-
solved at a higher amount!"
Pursuant to section 1126(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, only al-
lowed claims are entitled to vote on a plan of reorganization." In
most mass tort bankruptcies, it is impracticable to determine the al-
lowability of all claims prior to voting on a plan of reorganization.
Bankruptcy Rule 3018(a) provides a mechanism which enables the
claimant to participate in the voting on the plan of reorganization
without the delay attendant to an individual determination of each
claim. Bankruptcy Rule 3018(a) states that "[n]otwithstanding ob-
jection to a claim or interest, the court after notice and hearing may
temporarily allow the claim or interest in an amount which the court
deems proper for the purpose of accepting or rejecting a plan.""lcc
Courts frequently allow the holders of disputed claims in a mass tort
bankruptcy to vote such claims at $1.00 per claim."
Liquidation of mass tort claims following confirmation of a plan
of reorganization is unique. The typical method of liquidating claims
post-confirmation is through a claims resolution facility and/or a
claimants' trust. For example, in In re A.H. Robins,"° the confirmed
plan of reorganization established a settlement fund to compensate
parties who claimed injuries resulting from the use of the Dalkon
Shield intrauterine device. The plan provided for the establishment
101. See In re Baldwin-United, 55 B.R. at 898.
102. 944 F.2d 997 (2d Cir. 1991).
103. See id. at 1006.
104. 137 B.R. 219 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1992).
105. See id. at 226.
106. See 11 U.S.C. § 1126(a) (1994).
107. Bankruptcy Rule 3018(a).
108. See In re Johns-Manville Corp., 68 B.R. 618, 631 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986),
affd, 843 F.2d 636, 647 (2d Cir. 1988); see also In re A.H. Robins Co., 88 B.R. at
746-47 (finding that placing a nominal value on each claim for voting purposes
was approved), affd, 880 F.2d 694 (4th Cir. 1989).
109. 88 B.R. 742 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1988).
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of a claimants' trust and a claims resolution facility. ° The claims
resolution facility provided claimants with various options in which to
seek compensation for their injuries beginning with "instant settle-
ment offers," in which claimants received $725.00 in exchange for a
release.' If a claimant rejected all settlement offers, the claimant
could proceed with certain litigation alternatives, including individual
jury trials."2
Similarly, with respect to its silicone breast implant litigation,
Dow Coming recently proposed a plan of reorganization in which
claimants are given the option of settling their dispute with Dow
Coming over whether breast implants cause disease or litigating such
dispute.' Claimants choosing to settle by voting to accept the plan
will have their claims channeled to a settlement trust where various
settlement options are provided to resolve those claims.' In con-
trast, claimants wishing to continue to litigate the legal merit of their
claims against Dow Coming will have their claims channeled to a liti-
gation trust.115 The first step in the litigation process for all rejecting
claimants is a threshold common issue causation trial on the question
of whether silicone breast implants cause disease. 6 If any claims
survive that common issue causation trial, such claims will proceed
through a series of sequential steps, including an individual jury trial
if the claim is not resolved through an earlier step.'
Notwithstanding questions over the legal effect of estimation,
the authority of bankruptcy courts to estimate mass tort personal in-
jury claims for purposes of determining the feasibility of a plan of re-
organization can provide a mechanism to quantify the extent of the
debtor's liability to the holders of mass tort claims. This ability to
estimate claims usually helps to define the outlines of a possible con-
sensual resolution of the mass tort claims in the case.
110. See id. at 746-47.
111. See Georgene M. Vairo, The Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust: Paradigm
Lost (Or Found)?, 61 FORDHAM L. REv. 617, 633 (1992).
112. See In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709,744 (4th Cir. 1989).
113. James P. Miller, Dow Coming Offers Revised Reorganization Plan, WALL
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VII. DISCHARGE OF CLAIMS
Section 1141(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a con-
firmed plan of reorganization is binding upon any creditor whether or
not (i) its claim is impaired under the plan or (ii) it voted to accept
the plan."' Further, section 1141(d)(1)(A) provides that confirmation
of a plan discharges the debtor-unless sections 1141(d)(2) through
(4), the plan, or the order confirming the plan provide otherwise-
from any debt that arose before the confirmation date."9 This is true
whether or not: (i) a proof of claim is filed or deemed filed under
section 501; (ii) such claim is allowed under section 502; or (iii) the
claimant votes to accept the plan." Section 1141(a) clearly contem-
plates that the debtor will be discharged from all "claims" as defined
in section 101(5) of the Bankruptcy Code. As discussed previously,
the courts are divided on the question of whether "future claims" are
"claims" within the meaning of section 101(5)." '
A statutory discharge of future claims would serve two goals of
bankruptcy: providing the debtor with a "fresh start" and promoting
an equitable distribution of the debtor's assets among its creditors.
For example, if a confirmed plan does not discharge future claims
arising from the debtor's pre-petition conduct, then such claimants
may receive a preferential recovery if their injuries become manifest
post-confirmation and they are permitted to recover more than the
confirmed plan provides for similar, yet pre-confirmation claims. In
addition, the claims of post-confirmation claimants could deplete the
resources of the reorganized debtor, leaving those claimants who
manifest injury thereafter with little or nothing to recover and possi-
bly impairing the. reorganized debtor's ability to perform its obliga-
tions to pre-confirmation claimants according to the debtor's con-
firmed plan.
Yet, the extent to which future claims are discharged upon the
confirmation of a plan is unclear. Arguably, future claims may be
discharged because section 1141(d)(1)(A) provides for a discharge of
any pre-confirmation "debt",'2 a term that section 101(12) defines as
"liability on a claim"," without any limitation as to when the liability
118. See 11 U.S.C. § 1141(a) (1994).
119. See id. § 1141(d)(1)(A).
120. See id.
121. See supra notes 47-70 and accompanying text.
122. See 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(1)(A).
123. See i. § 101(12).
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arises. However, as discussed above, whether future claims are
within the present statutory definition of "claim" is uncertain. 24 If
not, the "debts" discharged by section 1141(d)(1)(A) do not include
future claims. Moreover, the "creditors" upon whom the provisions
of a confirmed plan are binding under section 1141(a) are limited to
entities who have claims against the debtor "that arose at the time of
or before the order for relief . ... s" which could exclude future
claims. Thus, no statutes provide clear guidance concerning this is-
sue.
Some courts have allowed the discharge of future claims arising
out of the debtor's pre-petition conduct even if the holders of those
claims were not represented in the case and the plan of reorganiza-
tion did not address them.12 Other courts have compromised a
debtor's successful reorganization, or frustrated the expectations of
the debtor's successor, by refusing to allow the discharge of future
claims that were afforded neither representation during the bank-
ruptcy case nor compensation under the confirmed plan. 2
VIII. CONCLUSION
Bankruptcy is a powerful tool to assist a company burdened by
mass tort litigation. Mass tort bankruptcies present complex and
novel questions that the bankruptcy courts must address. Although
chapter 11 may not be the first remedy explored by a company facing
significant mass tort claims, it may prove to be the only vehicle
through which ongoing litigation can be stopped, through the benefits
of the automatic stay; centralized, through the transfer of claims to
the district court presiding over the bankruptcy case; and ultimately
resolved, with the debtor receiving a discharge of such claims.
124. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
125. 11 U.S.C. §101(10)(A).
126. See, e.g., Texaco, Inc. v. Sanders (In re Texaco, Inc.), 182 B.R. 937, 952-54
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995) (involving environmental claims).
127. See, e.g., Fairchild Aircraft, Inc. v. Cambell (In re Fairchild Aircraft
Corp.), 184 B.R. 910, 920-25 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1995).
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